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ESSAY 
mDICIAL EXCLUSIVITY AND POLITICAL 
INSTABILITY 
Neal Devins* and Louis Fisher** 
JUDICIAL supremacy is down but hardly out. Notwithstanding calls by interest groups that Congress "is now the court of last 
resort,"' the myth of judicial exclusivity nonetheless persists. The 
popular press treats United States Supreme Court rulings as defini-
tive,2 law school casebooks typically identify constitutional law as 
the work of the Court/ and when a government official-make that 
Reagan Administration Attorney General Edwin Meese-argues 
that Supreme Court decisions are not "binding on all persons and 
parts of government,"4 editorialists and representatives of the Wash-
ington Post, New York Times, and American Bar Association are 
sent into a state of apoplexy.5 Among legal academics, however, it 
• Ernest W. Goodrich Professor of Law and a Lecturer in Government at the College 
of William and Mary. Alan Meese, John McGinnis, Suzanna Sherry, Emily Sherwin, 
and Bill Treanor provided valuable commentary on an earlier version of this essay. 
•• Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers at the Congressional Research Service 
of the Library of Congress. 
1 W. John Moore, In Whose Court?, 23 Nat'! J. 2396,2400 (1991}. 
2 In a 1987 survey conducted by the Hearst Corporation and reported in the Wash-
ington Post, six out of ten respondents identified the Supreme Court as the "final 
authority on constitutional change." For the Post, those six were "correctQ." Ruth 
Marcus, Constitution Confuses Most Americans: Public Ill-Informed on U.S. Blue-
print, Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 1987, at A13. See also Joan Biskupic, The Shrinking 
Docket, Wash. Post, Mar. 18, 1996, at A15 (discussing the Supreme Court's shrinking 
docket and noting: "The importance of the Court, of course, is not in its numbers. It 
is in the Court having the last word. The justices are the final arbiter of what is in the 
Constitution."). 
3 See Neal E. Devins, Correspondence: The Stuff of Constitutional Law, 77 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1795 (1992). 
• Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979,983 (1987). 
s Michael Kinsley, Meese's Stink Bomb, Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 1986, at A19; Anthony 
Lewis, Law or Power?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23; Stuart Taylor Jr., Liberties 
Union Denounces Meese, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1986, at A17 (quoting then-ABA 
president Eugene C. Thomas as saying that this disregard would "shake the founda-
tions of our system"). 
83 
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is now commonplace to discuss constitutional law as something larger 
and more complex than merely court rulings.6 The degree to which 
some scholars now dismiss the Supreme Court as the exclusive source 
of constitutional law prompted Mike Paulsen recently to ask, some-
what plaintively: "Will nobody defend judicial supremacy anymore?"7 
Fear not, Mike. Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer have heard 
your cry.8 In an analysis that is "neither empirical nor historical" (it 
cannot be), they derive judicial supremacy from "preconstitutional" 
norms.9 In particular, Alexander and Schauer believe that vesting in 
the Court the authority to interpret, with finality, the meaning of the 
Constitution contributes to political stability.10 Correspondingly, 
they claim that "an important-perhaps the important-function of 
law is its ability to settle authoritatively what is to be done."11 
Alexander and Schauer's argument is important, provocative, 
and unconvincing. To their credit, by grounding judicial supremacy 
on law's settlement function, they have reinvigorated the academic 
debate over democratic government's duty to obey Court edicts. 
Nevertheless, if stability is the problem, judicial exclusivity is not the 
answer. Their ahistorical analysis collides with everything we know 
about the Court as a political institution. In particular, Alexander 
and Schauer do not take into account how concentrating complete 
interpretive authority in the Court would create political instability 
and undermine the fragile foundation that supports and sustains ju-
6 See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Proc-
ess (1988); Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law (2d 
ed. 1996); Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Power and American Character: Censoring Our-
selves in an Anxious Age (1994); Neal Devins, ed., Elected Branch Influences in 
Constitutional Decisionmaking, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1993, at 1, 3-4; 
Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993); Michael 
J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. 
Rev. 1 (1996); Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 
1071 (1987); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power 
to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217 (1994); David A. Strauss, Presidential In-
terpretation of the Constitution, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113 (1993); Robin West, The 
Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 241 (1993). 
7 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to 
Professors Levinson and Eisgruber, 83 Geo. LJ. 385,385 (1994). 
8 Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997). 
9 Id. at 1369. 
10 Id. at 1375-77. 
11 Jd. at 1377. 
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dicial power. Instead of suggesting that the judiciary can settle in any 
decisive way such contentious issues as abortion, affirmative action, 
federalism, privacy, race-based districting, and religious freedom, the 
record of the last two centuries points to a more modest and circum-
scribed role for the courts.12 No doubt at various times in our history 
the Supreme Court has attempted a more ambitious agenda, but it 
has done so at great cost to itself and the nation.13 
Perhaps we are being unfair. Alexander and Schauer "engage in 
direct normative inquiry,"14 considering democratic acceptance of 
what judicial supremacy "should" be.15 Yet, even if it was under-
stood that the Court should have the last word on the Constitution's 
meaning, judicial exclusivity would marginalize the Constitution by 
overwhelming the obligation to follow the Court's constitutional 
judgments with the competing policy-driven "obligations" of govern-
ment officials.16 In other words, absent the constraints imposed by 
social and political forces, the Court's constitutional judgments will 
be less relevant and hence less stable. The tugs and pulls of politics 
therefore make the Constitution more relevant and more durable. 
I. PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION 
Can the Constitution be preserved and honored without "a final 
interpretive authority for choosing among competing [constitutional] 
interpretations?"17 For modem-day defenders of judicial supremacy, 
such as Alexander and Schauer, this question is little more than rhe-
torical. Suggesting that the "settlement and coordination functions 
of law"18 are the Constitution's "chief raison d'etre,"19 judicial suprem-
acy is heralded as the only way to protect "a single written constitu-
tion" from "shifting political fortunes."20 This conclusion, however, 
12 See infra Section II.A; notes 111-120 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 76-86, 101-104 and accompanying text. 
14 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1370. 
15 Id. at 1369. 
1~ See infra Section II.B. Making matters worse, the Court might well attempt to 
demonstrate its last word status by purposefully distancing itself from populist senti-
ment through its decisions. 
17 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1381. 
1~ Id. at 1376. 
19 Id. at 1381. 
'" Id. at 1376. 
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is not suggested in the text or structure of the Constitution, the fram-
ers' intent, historical development, or even Supreme Court declara-
tions of its own status as the ultimate and final interpreter of the 
Constitution.21 Instead, the overriding value promoted by the fram-
ers was a system of checks and balances, with each branch asserting 
its own powers and protecting its own prerogatives. 
Alexander and Schauer dodge this historical bullet by reminding 
us that their inquiry is "normative" and suggesting that, in any event, 
"[t]he present, and not the past, decides whether the past is rele-
vant."22 For an essay on whether a constitution ought to have an 
authoritative interpreter, this bit of trickery might suffice. For an 
essay on "The Constitution of the United States," however, it is self-
contradictory to argue that judicial supremacy is needed to defend 
the Constitution. Claiming a power for the Court that was never 
intended hardly preserves and defends the Constitution. Instead, 
this claim debases and threatens constitutional government. 
The Constitution's text, its original intent, and intervening prac-
tice support a form of judicial review far more limited than that of-
fered by Alexander and Schauer. Indeed, no specific language in the 
Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to declare certain 
governmental conduct unconstitutional, let alone the exclusive au-
thority to do so. Judicial review can be derived from some sections 
of the Constitution, but in almost every instance it is the power of 
federal courts to strike down state actions or to void congressional 
statutes that threaten judicial independence.23 The debates that oc-
21 On Court declarations of its last word status, see infra text accompanying notes 
58-75; see also Louis Fisher, The Curious Belief in Judicial Supremacy, 25 Suffolk U. 
L. Rev. 85 (1991) (discussing various Justices' interpretations of the Court's role). 
22 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1370. 
23 The specification that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby," U.S. Const. art. VI, makes clear that 
federal courts must review the actions of state governments. One might argue that 
congressional statutes not "in [p]ursuance" of the Constitution are subject to judicial 
nullification, but judicial review over the coequal branches represents a major ag-
grandizement and requires convincing evidence. Furthermore, in extending the judi-
cial power to all cases "arising Under the Constitution," it was "generally supposed 
that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature." 2 
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1937) [hereinafter Records]. For example, cases of a "judiciary nature" would in-
clude congressional statutes that reduce the salaries of federal judges. However de-
fined, the idea of cases of a "judiciary nature" is something far short of giving the Su-
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curred during state ratification conventions suggest that the framers 
believed judicial review of Congress was limited and the President 
had the power to independently interpret the Constitution.24 Al-
though there was some support for a broad conception of judicial 
review,25 no one argued for judicial supremacy.26 
Early Court rulings confirm this understanding. From 1789 to 
1803, several Justices wondered whether the power of judicial review 
would reach to congressional and presidential actions. They could 
not decide whether the power existed, whether it was vested in the 
Court, or under what conditions it might be invoked.27 
Certainly judicial supremacy would have been alien to the mem-
bers of the First Congress. During the debate in 1789 on the Presi-
dent's removal power, James Madison saw no reason to defer to the 
judiciary on the constitutionality of what Congress was about to do.28 
preme Court ultimate control over the meaning of the Constitution. At the Virginia 
ratifying convention, for example, James Madison interpreted "arising under" to jus-
tify judicial review only against the states. 3 The Debates in the Several State Con-
ventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 532 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1968). 
Alexander Hamilton made the same point in Federalist No. 80. The Federalist No. 
80, at 503 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). In addition, 
several delegates at the Philadelphia convention spoke in favor of judicial review 
when invoked against unconstitutional state laws. 2 Records, supra, at 92-93 (remarks 
by Gouverneur Morris and James Madison). 
24 See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 219-92; Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 
40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905,921-22 (1990). 
z.< See William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judi-
cial Review, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 491 (1994). 
26 Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution 195-97 (1990). 
27 See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (Chase, J.) (empha-
sizing that if the Supreme Court had such a power it should never be exercised "but 
in a very clear case"); see also comments in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 
(1798) (Iredell, J.) (stating that the authority of the court to declare a statute void is 
of a "delicate" nature and the Court will not use such power except in a "clear and 
urgent case"); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800) (Chase, J.) (noting that 
while some circuits have decided the Supreme Court could declare an act unconstitu-
tional, the Supreme Court itself has not so held). Moreover, when John Marshall 
provided the rationale for judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, it was through a 
chain of reasoning that presupposed presidential authority to interpret the Constitu-
tion. See Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 919-20. 
28 1 Annals of Congress 500 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Yet in introducing the Bill of 
Rights in the House of Representatives, Madison predicted that once they were in-
corporated into the Constitution, "independent tribunals of justice will consider 
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impene-
trable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive." 
ld. at439. 
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While acknowledging that "the exposition of the laws and Constitu-
tion devolves upon the Judiciary," he begged to know on what 
ground "any one department draws from the Constitution greater 
powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers of the 
several departments?"29 
Early presidents also believed that each branch of government 
should act as an independent interpreter of the Constitution. George 
Washington's first veto was on constitutional grounds.30 Thomas 
Jefferson, viewing the Alien and Sedition Acts (which criminalized 
speech critical of the government) as patently unconstitutional, used 
his pardon power to discharge "every person under punishment or 
prosecution under the sedition law. "31 Andrew Jackson announced 
his own theory of coordinate construction in a message vetoing leg-
islation to recharter the Bank of the United States.32 Since the Court 
had previously upheld the constitutionality of the Bank,33 Jackson 
was under pressure to consider the matter as settled by precedent 
and judicial decision.34 He disagreed: The Supreme Court's authority 
over Congress and the President would extend only to "such influ-
ence as the force of their reasoning may deserve. "35 
Jackson's position has been followed by every other President. 
Abraham Lincoln, in repudiating Dred Scott v. Sandford/6 argued 
that if government policy on "vital questions affecting the whole 
people is to be irrevocably fixed" by the Supreme Court, "the people 
will have ceased to be their own rulers. "37 Franklin Delano Roose-
velt lashed out at the Lochner Court for taking the country back to 
the "horse and buggy" days.38 Richard Nixon's campaign to undo 
29 I d. at 500. 
30 See Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 907. 
3
' Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (July 22, 1804), in 11 The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 42, 43 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905). See also Easter-
brook, supra note 24, at 907 (noting that the effect of Jefferson's pardon was to nul-
lify the statutes "as much as if the Supreme Court had held them unconstitutional"). 
32 3 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1144-45 (James D. 
Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter Compilation]. 
33 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
34 3 Compilation, supra note 32, at 1144. 
35 Id. at 1145. 
36 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
37 7 Compilation, supra note 32, at 3210. 
38 4 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Court Disap-
proves, 1935, at 209-10 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938) [hereinafter Public Papers of 
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Warren Court liberalism,39 Ronald Reagan's attack on Roe v. Wade,40 
and Bill Clinton's embrace of efforts to "reverse" Court standards 
governing religious liberty41 also follow this pattern. 
For its part, ·Congress has launched numerous challenges to the 
Court. In response to Dred Scott, Congress passed a bill prohibit-
ing slavery in the territories.42 Disagreeing with the Court's 1918 
ruling that the commerce power could not be used to regulate child 
labor, 43 Congress two decades later again based child labor legisla-
tion on the commerce clause.44 Public accommodations protections 
contained in the 1964 Civil Rights Act similarly followed in the 
wake of a Supreme Court decision rejecting such protections.45 More 
recently, lawmakers have challenged Court rulings on abortion, 
busing, flag burning, religious freedom, voting rights, and the leg-
islative veto.46 
Judicial exclusivity, then, finds no support in Congressional and 
White House practices, in the debates surrounding the drafting and 
ratification of the Constitution, or in the Constitution itself. To the 
extent that language and tradition matter,47 the argument for judi-
cial supremacy is a nonstarter. 
Alexander and Schauer, as well as others before them, have navi-
gated this terrain, discounting the relevance of notoriously ambi-
guous texts and indications of intention which presuppose that the 
"intentions of long-dead people from a different social world should 
Roosevelt]. 
3
' See Fisher & Devins, supra note 6, at 94-95, 247-48. 
-4()410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Fisher & Devins, supra note 6, at 184-94. 
41 See Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 2 Pub. 
Papers 2000 (Nov. 16, 1993). 
42 Act of June 19, 1862, c. 111, 12 Stat. 432 ("An Act to secure freedom to all Per-
sons within the Territories of the United States"). 
43 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
44 This episode is recounted in Fisher & Devins, supra note 6, at 70-76. 
4s See id. at 87-94. 
"See generally id. (discussing recent constitutional challenges before the Court). 
47 For an argument that language matters, see Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 399 (1985). For the classic argument that tradition matters, see Young-
stown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-97 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323-24 (1819) 
(contending that historical practices are relevant in determining the division of pow-
ers among the branches). 
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influence us."48 When it comes to judicial exclusivity, however, the 
problem with "tak[ing] neither original intent nor intervening prac-
tice as authoritative"49 is that there is not a scintilla of evidence 
supporting the Court's ultimate interpreter status.50 Alexander and 
Schauer, for example, never explain how judicial exclusivity, a prin-
ciple derived froin "the nature of law" can trump, well, the supreme 
LAW of the land. Suggesting that "preconstitutional" norms and 
"meta-rules" are more important than the Constitution itselt1 is, in 
the end, not enough to pull off the impossible feat of demonstrat-
ing fidelity to the Constitution by disregarding its basic command 
about the separation of powers. 
II. PROMOTING POLITICAL STABILITY 
There may be an element of unfairness in our efforts to link the 
Constitution's design with interpretive theories intended to make 
the Constitution the "supreme law of the land." We do not, for ex-
ample, consider the central question which animates Alexander and 
Schauer's admittedly "normative inquiry," that is, "[w]hat ... is 
law for?"52 Yet, even assuming-as they do-that law's principal 
function is to "settle [matters] authoritatively" and promote "stabil-
ity,"53 the argument for judicial supremacy falls short. Without the 
powers of purse and sword, "[t]he Court must take care to speak 
and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions."54 As 
such, rather than advance its institutional self-interest through claims 
of judicial supremacy, the Court understands its role in government 
43 Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373,379 (1982). See also 
Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1370 (explaining "what in fact has the status of 
law, and what should have the status of law-can only be decided non-historically"). 
Moreover, as a matter of realpolitik, "non-deference is often good political strategy," 
and lawmakers and the President suffer "neither legally nor politically" for making 
"politically popular or otherwise attractive policy decisions ... flatly inconsistent with 
established precedent." Id. at 1365-66. 
•• Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1370. 
so Occasional claims by Supreme Court Justices that they speak the last word prove 
just the opposite; that is, the Court is extremely sensitive to social and political forces. 
See infra Part II.A. 
51 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1369, 1370. 
52 Id. at 1370-71. 
53 Id. at 1371, 1376. Law actually has many different natures including flexibility, 
utility, and the service of human needs. 
54 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,865 (1992). 
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as limited. Correspondingly, even if Court decisions were viewed as 
final, elected officials would sublimate their "duty to obey the law" 
to allegedly overriding duties more consistent with their policy pref-
erences. This marginalization of the Constitution is directly at odds 
with the settlement function of law. For the Constitution to truly 
operate as a stabilizing force, it must be relevant to the lives of 
democratic government and the American people. Judicial exclusivity 
cannot accomplish this task; rather, stability can only be achieved 
through a give-and-take process involving all of government as well 
as the people. 
A. Settling Transcendent Values 
The history of the Supreme Court has been a search for various 
techniques and methods that will permit the judiciary to limit and 
constrain its own power. Justices understand, either by instinct or 
experience, that the hazards are great when the Court attempts to 
settle political, social, and economic matters best left to the politi-
cal process.55 Despite occasional utterances from the Court that it 
is the "ultimate interpreter"56 of the Constitution, Justices by ne-
cessity adhere to a philosophy that is much more modest, circum-
spect, and nuanced. Rather than settle transcendent values, Court 
decisions, at best, momentarily resolve the dispute immediately be-
fore the Court. 
The strongest support for this proposition, ironically, comes from 
those cases in which the Court has defended its authority to bind 
government officials through its interpretation of the Constitution. 
Marbury v. Madisont the supposed foundation of judicial suprem-
acy,53 nicely illustrates how political challenges to the Court's inter-
pretive authority and claims of judicial supremacy are inextricably 
linked to each other. When Marbury was decided, the Supreme 
Court and its Chief Justice, John Marshall, were under attack. 
Court foe Thomas Jefferson had just been elected President and, at 
ss See infra notes 62, 78, 86, 94 and accompanying text. 
~'See infra notes 63-71. 
57 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
5
' See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). Marbury, of course, did not 
rule that the Court's constitutional interpretations were final and definitive; instead, 
the Court simply declared that it had the power to invalidate unconstitutional Con-
gressional action. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-80. 
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his urging, Secretary of State James Madison openly challenged the 
Court's -authority to subject executive officers to judicial orders.59 
Further complicating matters, were the Court to rule against the 
Jeffersonians, Marshall believed that his political enemies would 
push for his impeachment.60 Unwilling to engage in a head-to-head 
confrontation with the Jeffersonians, the Court's supposed war cry 
in Marbury, that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is,"61 is window dressing for 
the Court's reasoning in ultimately ducking the Marbury dispute 
on jurisdictional grounds.62 As such, other than to assure that Wil-
liam Marbury did not get his job and to usher in a claim of judicial 
review debated ever since, Marbury settled very little, if anything. 
On those few occasions when the Court does insist that it is the 
"last word" in interpreting the Constitution, such announcements 
must be understood within their political context. Cooper v. Aaron,63 
the decision that Alexander and Schauer embrace, exemplifies this 
practice. The Court's claim that federal court constitutional inter-
pretations are "supreme"64 was made in the face of massive Southern 
resistance to Brown v. Board of Education,65 including Arkansas' 
enlistment of the National Guard to deny African-American school-
59 Specifically, when William Marbury challenged Madison's failure to deliver him a 
judicial commission, Madison refused to present a defense, thereby forcing the Court 
to decide the case without the benefit of the executive's arguments. See Fisher & 
Devins, supra note 6, at 25-35. 
ro Marshall took the impeachment threat seriously, contending that it would be bet-
ter for the elected branches to reverse a Court opinion by statute than to impeach 
Supreme Court Justices. See 3 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall: Con-
flict and Construction, 1800-1815, at 177 (1929) (citing letter from John Marshall, 
Chief Justice, to Samuel Chase, Associate Justice (Jan. 23, 1804)). Along these same 
lines, a modern day Court which regularly and unabashedly frustrated majoritarian 
preferences might find its members subject to the threat of impeachment. · 
61 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
62 As Chief Justice Warren Burger noted: "The [C]ourt could stand hard blows, but 
not ridicule, and the ale houses would rock with hilarious laughter" had Marshall is-
sued a mandamus ignored by the Jefferson administration. Warren E. Burger, The 
Doctrine of Judicial Review: Mr. Marshall, Mr. Jefferson, and Mr. Marbury, in Views 
from the Bench: The Judiciary and Constitutional Politics 7, 14 (Mark W. Cannon 
and David M. O'Brien eds., 1985). 
63 358 u.s. 1 (1958). 
61 358 U.S. at 18. The best academic treatment of Cooper is Daniel A. Farber, The 
Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. III. L. Rev. 
387 (1982). 
65 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
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children access to Little Rock's Central High School.66 Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, which reaffirmed the "central holding" of Roe 
v. Wade, similarly underscores the Court's belief that "a surrender 
to political pressure" would result in "profound and unnecessary 
damage" to the Court.67 The threat of resistance to its orders like-
wise animated invocations of judicial supremacy in Baker v. Carr,68 
Powell v. McCormack,69 United States v. Nixon,70 and City of Boerne 
v. Flores.71 
The Supreme Court's practice of declaring itself the final word 
on the Constitution's meaning when it feels especially challenged 
by the other branches is anything but surprising. Invariably, the 
Court takes a bold stand because it fears that the political order 
will ignore its command. These sweeping declarations of power 
cloak institutional self-doubts, much as a gorilla pounds his chest 
M See Fisher & Devins, supra note 6, at 242-56. Moreover, recognizing inherent 
limits on its power to compel Southern schools to comply with Brown, Cooper was 
the Court's only statement on school desegregation from 1955-64 (when Congress 
encouraged the Court to reenter the school desegregation fray through its enactment 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). 
67 505 U.S. 833, 853, 867, 869 (1992). Refusing to bend to the stated desires of the 
presidents who appointed them and overrule Roe "under fire," Justices Sandra Day 
O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter "call(ed] the contending sides of a 
national controversy to end their national division by accepting ... the Court's inter-
pretation of the Constitution." 1d. at 867. The Casey plurality, however, validated 
political challenges to Roe's rigid trimester standard by replacing it with a more def-
erential "undue burden" test. ld. at 873-79. 
"'369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). At oral arguments, counsel for Tennessee suggested 
that they might resist court-ordered reapportionment. Jack Wilson, Assistant Attor-
ney General of Tennessee, advised the Court about the sovereign rights of his state. 
56 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Con-
stitutional Law 656, 658-59, 666 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) 
(hereinafter Landmark Briefs]. 
69 395 U.S. 486,549 (1969). In Powell, the House of Representatives signaled that it 
might resist a court order requiring it to seat Adam Clayton Powell. See Robert B. 
McKay, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 117, 125-29 nn.42-44 
(1969). 
7
')418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974). During oral arguments, Nixon's attorney James St. 
Clair equivocated on Nixon's willingness to accept the Court's judgment on executive 
privilege as binding on the President. See 79 Landmark Briefs, supra note 68, at 861, 
871-72, 879; Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1364 & nn.21-22. 
71 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). Invalidating congressional efforts to "overrule" Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Boerne Court told Congress that it 
"will treat its precedents with the respect due them" and that "(t]he power to inter-
pret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary." 117 S. Ct. at 
2172,2166. 
HeinOnline -- 84 Va. L. Rev. 94 1998
94 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 84:83 
and makes threatening noises to avoid a fight. Invocations of judi-
cial supremacy, for example, often place few demands on the gov-
ernment (as in Marbury) or are linked with popular outcomes, as in 
Cooper, Baker v. Carr, Nixon, and Casey.72 
Lacking the power to appropriate funds or command the mili-
tary,73 the Court understands that it must act in a way that garners 
"public acceptance.74 In other words, as psychologists Tom Tyler and 
Gregory Mitchell observed, the Court seems to believe "that public 
acceptance of the Court's role as interpreter of the Constitution-
that is, the public belief in the Court's institutional legitimacy-
enhances public acceptance of controversial Court decisions. "75 1bis 
emphasis on public acceptance of the judiciary seems to be conclu-
sive proof that Court decisionmaking cannot be divorced from a 
case's (sometimes explosive) social and political setting. 
A more telling manifestation of how public opinion affects Court 
decisionmaking is evident when the Court reverses itself to conform 
its decisionmaking to social and political forces beating against it.76 
72 With respect to Cooper, although Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus' repudiation 
of Brown scored points with in-state voters, national public opinion favored President 
Eisenhower's decision to make Cooper a reality by sending federal troops into Little 
Rock. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change? 78 (1991). Like Cooper, Baker v. Carr risked ill will with state officials in 
order to reach an outcome popular in the national political arena. "Of sixty-three 
leading metropolitan daily newspapers, thirty-eight favored the Court's disposition of 
the [Baker] case, ten opposed it, and the remainder expressed neutral or confused 
opinions." Richard C. Cortner, The Apportionment Cases 144-47 (1970). With re-
spect to Nixon, public opinion strongly supported the Court's authority to order the 
President to release the tapes. See Louis Harris, President Should Obey Order to 
Give Up Tapes, The Harris Survey, July 29, 1974. Casey, in upholding Roe, relied on 
an "undue burden" standard that matched public opinion. See Neal Devins, Shaping 
Constitutional Values: Elected Government, the Supreme Court, and the Abortion 
Debate 73-74 (1996). 
73 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1366 & n.34. 
,. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 965-66 (recognizing the connection between the Court's 
"legitimacy" and "people's acceptance"). 
15 Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discre-
tionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 
Duke LJ. 703, 715 (1994). 
76 Recognizing the nexus between its authority and public acceptance, the Court is 
rarely out of step with prevailing mores. See, e.g., David Adamany, Legitimacy, 
Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 790 (1973); Robert 
A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 285 (1957); Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Criti-
cal Elections, 69 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 795 (1975); Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanen-
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Witness, for example, the collapse of the Lochner era under the 
weight of changing social conditions. Following Roosevelt's 1936 
election victory in all but two states, the Court, embarrassed by 
populist attacks against the Justices, announced several decisions 
upholding New Deal programs.n In explaining this transformation, 
Justice Owen Roberts recognized the extraordinary importance of 
public opinion in undoing the Lochner era: "Looking back, it is dif-
ficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular urge for 
uniform standards throughout the country-for what in effect was 
a unified economy."78 
Social and political forces also played a defining role in the 
Court's reconsideration of decisions on sterilization and the eugenics 
movement,79 state-mandated flag salutes,80 the Roe v. Wade trimester 
standard,81 the death penalty,82 states' rights,83 and much more.84 It did 
not matter that some of these earlier decisions commanded an im-
pressive majority of eight to one.85 Without popular support, these 
decisions settled nothing. Justice Robert Jackson instructed us that 
"[t]he practical play of the forces of politics is such that judicial 
power has often delayed but never permanently defeated the persis-
tent will of a substantial majority."86 As such, for a Court that wants 
haus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 985, 1023 (1990). 
71 On the role of the 1936 elections, see Michael Nelson, The President and the 
Court: Reinterpreting the Court-packing Episode of 1937, 103 Pol. Sci. Q. 267 (1988). 
On populist attacks, see Fisher, supra note 6, at 211. For an alternative explanation, 
see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 Va. L. Rev. 201 (1994). 
78 Owen J. Roberts, The Court and the Constitution: The Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Lectures, 1951, at 61 (1951). 
79 See Louis Fisher, Social Influences on Constitutional Law, 15 J. Pol. Sci. 7, 11-15 
(1987). 
&) See David R. Manwaring, Render Unto Caesar: The Flag-Salute Controversy 
154-60 (1962); H.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter 152-53 (1981). 
81 See Devins, supra note 72, at 56-77, 139-48. 
82 See Fisher, supra note 6, at 75-76. 
ro See Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitu-
tional Theory, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 845 (1996). 
84 For a useful summary of instances where the Court overturned earlier precedent, 
see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking 
and Theory, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68, app. (1991). 
85 See, e.g., Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding manda-
tory flag salute), overruled by West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). 
86 Robert H. Jackson, Maintaining Our Freedoms: The Role of the Judiciary, 19 Vi-
tal Speeches of the Day 759, 761 (1953). 
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to maximize its power and legitimacy, taking social and political 
forces into account is an act of necessity, not cowardice. Corre-
spondingly, when the Court gives short shrift to populist values or 
concerns, its decisionmaking is unworkable and destabilizing.87 
The Supreme Court may be the ultimate interpreter in a par-
ticular case, but not in the larger social issues of which that case is a 
reflection. Indeed, it is difficult to locate in the more than two cen-
turies of rulings from the Supreme Court a single decision that ever 
finally settled a transcendent question of constitutional law. When a 
decision fails to persuade or otherwise proves unworkable,88 elected 
officials, interest groups, academic commentators, and the press will 
speak their minds and the Court, ultimately, willlisten.89 
Even in decisions that are generally praised, such as Brown, the 
Court must calibrate its decisionmaking against the sentiments of the 
implementing community and the nation. In an effort to temper 
Southern hostility to its decision, the Court did not issue a remedy 
in the first Brown decision. 90 A similar tale is told by the Court's 
invocation of the so-called "passive virtues," that is, procedural and 
jurisdictional mechanisms that allow the Court to steer clear of poli-
tically explosive issues.91 For example, the Court will not "anticipate 
a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of de-
ciding it," not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is 
87 This is not to say that Court decisions at odds with popular will are always desta-
bilizing. Our point, instead, is that the Justices must be somewhat sensitive to social and 
political forces to avoid a destabilizing populist backlash or repudiation of the Court. 
83 The Court, for example, abandoned its decision in National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), because it produced doctrinal confusion rather than cre-
ated an intelligible principle for federalism. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 6, at 
94-104. 
89 On the power of the press and academic commentators, see Lawrence C. Mar-
shall, Intellectual Feasts and Intellectual Responsibilities, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 832, 
842-50 (1990); Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court's Story: Justice and Journalism 
at the Supreme Court, 105 Yale L.J. 1537 (1996). 
90 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). More than a decade after Brown, 
a federal appellate court noted: "A national effort, bringing together Congress, the 
executive, and the judiciary may be able to make meaningful the right of Negro chil-
dren to equal educational opportunities. The courts acting alone have failed." United 
States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 
East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. v. Davis, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). For further discussion, 
see infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text. 
91 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Pas-
sive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961). 
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required," nor "pass upon a constitutional question ... if there is ... 
some other ground," such as statutory construction, upon which to 
dispose of the case.92 This deliberate withholding of judicial power 
reflects the fact that courts lack ballot-box legitimacy and need to 
avoid costly collisions with the general public and other branches 
of government.93 
It is sometimes argued that courts operate on principle while the 
rest of government is satisfied with compromises.94 This argument 
is sheer folly. A multimember Court, like government, gropes in-
crementally towards consensus and decision through compromise, 
expediency, and ad hoc actions. "No good society," as Alexander 
Bickel observed, "can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be 
principle-ridden. "95 
Courts, like elected officials, cannot escape "[t]he great tides and 
currents which engulf' the rest of us.96 Rather than definitively set-
tling transcendent questions, courts must take account of social move-
ments and public opinion.97 When the judiciary strays outside and 
n Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U.S. 288,346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted). 
~3 Correspondingly, the threshold tests of jurisdiction, justiciability, standing, moot-
ness, ripeness, political questions, and prudential considerations are invoked regu-
larly and deliberately to protect an unelected and unrepresentative judiciary. See 
Don B. Kates, Jr. & William T. Barker, Mootness in Judicial Proceedings: Toward a 
Coherent Theory, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 1385 (1974); David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A 
Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 37 (1984); Gene R. 
Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 68 (1984). A typical example of this 
strategy is the use of ripeness in 1955 to avoid deciding the constitutionality of a Vir-
ginia miscegenation statute. Coming on the heels of the desegregation case of 1954, 
the Court was concerned that striking down a law banning interracial marriages would 
confirm the imagined fears of critics of desegregation who warned that integrated 
schools would lead to "mongrelization" of the white race. Years later, after the prin-
ciple of desegregation had been safely established and Congress and the President 
had forged strong bipartisan majorities to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court 
was then politically positioned to strike down the Virginia statute. See Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). 
9<The classic statement of this position is Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Prin-
ciples of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 14-15 (1959). See also Earl Warren, 
The Memoirs of Earl Warren 6 (1977) (explaining that progress in politics "could be 
made and most often was made by compromising and taking half a loaf where a 
whole loaf could not be obtained. The opposite is true so far as the judicial process 
was concerned."}. 
95 Bickel, supra note 91, at 49. 
%Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 168 (1921). 
~7 A number of studies explain how courts generally stay within the political bounda-
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opposes the policy of elected leaders, it does so at substantial risk. 
The Court maintains its strength by steering a course that fits with-
in the permissible limits of public opinion. Correspondingly, "the 
Court's legitimacy-indeed, the Constitution's-must ultimately 
spring from public acceptance," for ours is a "political system os-
tensibly based on consent. "98 
B. How Not to Marginalize the Constitution 
"In urging officials to subjugate their constitutional judgments to 
those of the Supreme Court,"99 Alexander and Schauer condemn 
the possible repudiation-by elected officials and the public-of 
Court decisions that operate outside of the societal mainstream. 
Under this account, courts should not bend to such lawless behav-
ior; instead, elected officials ought to face up to their "obligation" 
to treat Supreme Court decisions as law. Accordingly, the current 
system, where courts take social and political forces into account, is 
seen as backward. 
To say that the current system is, well, the current system does 
not answer Alexander and Schauer's admittedly normative inquiry. 
What if democratic government saw Supreme Court decisions as 
definitive statements of the Constitution's meaning? Would such a 
system, as Alexander and Schauer contend, "achieve a degree of 
settlement and stability" and "remove a series of transcendent ques-
tions from short-term majoritarian control?"100 
Of course not. A strict bifurcation-centering constitutional in-
terpretation in the courts while allocating other policy decisions to 
nonjudicial actors-would put both sectors on widely divergent paths. 
Policymakers would believe the Constitution to be irrelevant, some-
thing to treat with indifference. Lawmakers would debate policy 
divorced from constitutional concerns. As a consequence, the Con-
stitution would diminish in value and stature. If the Court viewed 
the Constitution as its exclusive domain, it would not moderate its 
ries of their times. See supra notes 72, 76. 
98 Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 76, at 992. See also Tyler & Mitchell, supra 
note 75 (explaining that the public's acceptance of the Court's role as interpreter of 
the Constitution improves the chances of the public accepting the Court's controver-
sial decisions). 
99 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1382. 
100 ld at 1380. 
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opinions to take account of social and political forces. The two sec-
tors would come to speak different languages, with courts increas-
ingly out of step with the political institutions. Judicial exclusivity 
creates disincentives for the courts to function within the govern-
mental orbit and, as such, is destabilizing. 
The failings of judicial exclusivity, we think, are best illustrated by 
Dred Scott,101 a heinous decision that demands disobedience. At the 
time the case was to be decided, the Court was sufficiently confident 
in its "high and independent character" that Justice John Catron 
advised President-elect James Buchanan that, in the matter of Dred 
Scott, the Court would "decide & settle a controversy which has so 
long and seriously agitated the country."102 Buchanan took the 
Court at its word: In his inaugural address, he assured the nation 
that the issue of slavery was before the Court and would be "speedily 
and finally settled. "103 The judicial settlement was certainly speedy 
but not final. Two days later, the Court issued Dred Scott, propel-
ling the nation into a bloody civil war that left, out of a population 
of approximately 30 million, more than 500,000 dead and another 
300,000 wounded.104 
Abraham Lincoln, through words and deeds, sought to counter-
mand Dred Scott. 105 What if Lincoln, applying Alexander and 
Schauer's logic, treated the decision as definitive vis-a-vis the Consti-
tution? The answer comes as a surprise: Lincoln, while having an 
"obligation to follow Dred Scott because of [the Supreme Court as] 
its source,"106 could have repudiated the decision through actions di-
rectly at odds with it, say, his issuance of the Emancipation Procla-
mation. Court decisions, under Alexander and Schauer's view, are 
"overridable obligations"-legally binding but appropriately sub-
ject to civil disobedience in times of crisis.107 
101 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
102 Letter from John Catron to James Buchanan (Feb. 19, 1857), in 10 The Works of 
James Buchanan 106 n.1 (John B. Moore ed., Antiquarian Press Ltd. 1960) (1908-11). 
103 6 Compilation, supra note 32, at 2962. 
1(\1 The World Almanac and Book of Facts 184, 380 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1997). 
105 For Lincoln, Court decisions were necessarily binding on the parties (Dred Scott 
and his "owner") but could not bind the elected government to judicially-imposed 
policymaking. 7 Compilation, supra note 32, at 3210. 
1c-s Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1382. 
107 I d. 
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Alexander and Schauer do not blink when making this argument. 
In language critical to their analysis, they answer "the challenge of 
Dred Scott":108 "Given the inadvisability of designing a decision 
procedure around one case that might never be repeated, it is better 
to treat Dred Scott as aberrational, recognizing that officials can 
always override judicial interpretations if necessary, especially if 
they are willing to suffer the political consequences. "109 
Try as they might, it will not do to treat Dred Scott as aberra-
tional. The Supreme Court regularly confronts divisive, emotional 
issues, issues where lawmakers and the public may well find "over-
riding values" that warrant civil disobedience. 110 Moreover, if policy-
makers treat Supreme Court rulings as final, some outlet will have to 
be found for expressing discontent with the consequences of disfa-
vored Court rulings. In particular, knowing that they cannot engage 
in constitutional dialogues which challenge the underlying correct-
ness of Court decisionmaking, policymakers may well engage in 
civil disobedience, especially when the voting public disapproves of 
the Court. Rather than "aberrations," such challenges may become 
an important part of public life. 
Consider, for example, the willingness of democratic institutions 
to resist Court rulings on abortion, affirmative action, busing, child 
labor, the death penalty, flag burning, gay marriage, the legislative 
veto, school prayer, voting rights, and religious liberty.111 Today, 
these challenges take place in the framework of give-and-take dia-
logues among the Court, elected officials, and the public. Were ju-
dicial supremacy to rule the day, however, some or all of these 
challenges might become "occasions for disobedience. "112 Indeed, 
when Supreme Court decisions on the minimum wage,113 abortion,114 
103 ld. 
109 ld. at 1383. In a provocative response to Alexander & Schauer, Emily Sherwin 
suggests that the Court ought to have the last word on all questions of constitutional 
interpretation, including slavery. See Emily S.herwin, Ducking Dred Scott: A Re-
sponse to Alexander and Schauer, 15 Const. Commentary (forthcoming Spring 1998) 
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
110 See supra note 46 and accompanying text; infra notes 111-115 and accompanying 
text. 
111 Several of these episodes are discussed in Fisher & Devins, supra note 6. 
112 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1382. 
113 See 4 Public Papers of Roosevelt, supra note 38, at 205. 
114 See Ronald Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation 15, 19-21 
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and religious liberty115 already have been analogized to Dred Scott, 
there is good reason to think that such challenges will, in fact, take 
place. Whether or not they succeed, it is difficult to see how judi-
cial exclusivity would either promote stability or nullify majoritar-
ian control of transcendent questions. 
Even if Dred Scott is truly aberrational, judicial exclusivity is 
likely to marginalize the Court and, with it, the Constitution. Demo-
cratic institutions will only take the Constitution seriously if they 
have some sense of stake in it. Alexander and Schauer do not disa-
gree; for them, a virtue of judicial exclusivity is that political discus-
sion "might be richer precisely for its lack of reliance on ritualistic 
incantations of constitutional provisions. "116 Yet, by fencing out 
politicized constitutional discourse, the Court's educative function 
will be severely limited as will the enduring values of the Constitu-
tion itself.117 
Alexander and Schauer are hardly troubled by this state of affairs. 
If anything, they think policymakers ought to steer clear of all mat-
ters touched upon in Supreme Court rulings. In order to "generate[] 
a single conception of what the Constitution require[s],"118 for ex-
ample, they would encourage lawmakers not to expand constitu-
tional protections beyond the floor set by the Supreme Court.119 By 
this interpretation, Alexander and Schauer would then disapprove 
of legislation authorizing disparate impact proofs in voting rights and 
employment discrimination legislation; legislation and regulation 
authorizing the assignment of women to combat aircraft; legislation 
(1984); see also Justice Scalia's dissent in Casey, 505 U.S. at 984 (Scalia, J. dissenting) 
(equating the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of abortion rights with Dred Scott). 
115 See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S. 2969 Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 42 (1993) (statement of Oliver S. Tho-
mas, General Counsel, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs). 
116 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1385. 
117 
"At its best," the Supreme Court produces "reasoned opinions that justify its 
claim to be the resident philosopher of the American constitutional system." Richard 
Funston, A Vital National Seminar: The Supreme Court in American Political Life 
217 (1978). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative 
Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 961 (1992) (asserting that the Supreme Court some-
times uses its educative function to offer "lessons" to inspire citizens); Eugene V. 
Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 208 
(1952) (describing Court's role in the discussion of problems, declaration of princi-
ples, and as an educational body). 
11
" Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1385. 
119 See id. 
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and regulation allowing federal employees, including members of 
the armed services, to wear an item of religious apparel on their 
clothing; and other initiatives launched by democratic government 
in the face of Supreme Court decisions limiting individual rights.120 
By stifling public discourse in this way, the Constitution becomes 
less relevant. Constitutional arguments will no longer be used as a 
roadblock to stymie progressive reforms or, alternatively, to expand 
constitutional protections beyond the "floor" set by the Supreme 
Court. While Alexander and Schauer do not foreclose policyruak-
ing on matters that implicate constitutional values, elected officials 
are discouraged from doing so and, when they do, they are forbidden 
from discussing those fundamental values that underlie the Consti-
tution and, with it, the United States itself. The virtues of "settle-
ment for settlement's sake"121 pale in relation to these costs. 
These costs are particularly acute in two categories of cases that 
are outside the radar of judicial supremacy proponents. One in-
volves underenforced constitutional norms, that is, matters that for 
one reason or another are not likely to make their way into court.122 
Here, it is left to democratic government to define the Constitu-
tion's meaning. Yet, if elected government is discouraged from 
thinking about the Constitution, it is unlikely that these matters 
will receive serious treatment, if any at all. 123 
120 See Fisher & Devins, supra note 6, at 256-88 (discussing employment and vot-
ing), id. at 305-16 (discussing women in the military); see also 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1994) 
(addressing religious apparel in military); Peter Baker, Workplace Religion Policy 
Due, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1997, at A1 (describing executive guidelines protecting 
religious expression in the federal workplace). 
121 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1385. 
122 The best treatment of this topic is Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Le-
gal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978). 
Examples of underenforced constitutional norms include the veto, the pocket veto, 
recess appointments, the incompatibility clause, war powers, and covert operations, 
discussed in Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside the Courts, 
18 Pepp. L. Rev. 57 (1990) (arguing that many separation of powers disputes are set-
tled not in the courts, but through trade-offs and compromises between the President 
and Congress). See also William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of 
the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 885 (1995) 
(describing the property rights movement as illustrative of how political branches 
give serious treatment to underenforced constitutional norms). 
123 Alexander and Schauer are wrong in presuming that the political branches never 
give serious treatment to these matters. See Mark V. Tushnet, The Hardest Question 
in Constitutional Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1996) (discussing legislative consideration 
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The second category involves instances in which the Court sees 
itself as a partner with government in shaping constitutional values. 
As a way of minimizing error, miscalculation, and needless conflicts 
with sosiety and coequal branches, the Court sometimes enlists the 
help of elected government.124 School desegregation is a particularly 
telling example of this practice. More than a decade after Brown, 
the percentage of African-American children in all-black schools in 
the South stood at ninety-eight percent.125 Through the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and other federal initiatives, however, this figure had 
dropped to twenty-five percent in 1968.126 More significant, with the 
President, congressional leadership, and the public committed to 
undoing Jim Crow laws, the Court was emboldened to attack dis-
crimination and segregation "root and branch."127 
Herein lies the real danger of judicial exclusivity. In rejecting 
such constitutional decisionmaking by other branches, judicial ex-
clusivity does little to promote stability. It encourages acrimony, 
not cooperation. Democratic government, rather than engage the 
Court in a constitutional dialogue, will give short shrift to the Court 
and the Constitution. For its part, the Court will neither enlist 
democratic government's help nor look to public opinion as a meas-
ure of its legitimacy. No longer constrained by its responsibilities 
as educator (Why educate if populist constitutional discourse is not 
a public good?) and certain of its status as final constitutional arbi-
ter, the Court will see little value in calibrating its decisions against 
of the "emoluments clause," a constitutional provision unlikely to be considered by 
the federal courts). 
12
• The Court and Congress have acted jointly on many constitutional issues. See 
Fisher, supra note 6, at 247-51. An early example is Congress' response to the 1890 
Supreme Court ruling in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). In Leisy, the Supreme 
Court ruled that a state's prohibition of intoxicating liquors could not be applied to 
"original packages" or kegs, but qualified its opinion by saying that states could not 
exclude incoming articles "without congressional permission." ld. at 124-25. Con-
gress quickly overturned the decision by allowing states, through their police powers, 
to regulate incoming liquor "in original packages or otherwise." Original Packages 
Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1994)). A more recent 
example is Congress's prohibition of newspaper searches, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, in the 
wake of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, a decision upholding such searches but inviting 
legislative efforts to protect "against possible abuses." 436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978). For 
further discussion, see Fisher & Devins, supra note 6, at 3. 
125 Gary Orfield, Public School Desegregation in the United States, 1968-1980, at 5 
(1983). 
126 ld. 
127 Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,438 (1968). 
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social and political forces. 128 Indeed, any such calibration would 
implicitly reject a decisionmaking model that equates stability with 
supremacy. 
Pragmatism and statesmanship must temper abstract legal analy-
sis. De Toqueville recognized in the 1830s that the judicial power 
"is enormous, but it is the power of public opinion. [Judges] are 
all-powerful as long as the people respect the law; but they would 
be impotent against popular neglect or contempt of the law. "129 
Arguments to the contrary, that judicial exclusivity will have a sta-
bilizing effect, won't do. To be stabilizing, court decisions must 
command respect and be generally acceptable and understandable. 
C. Continuing Colloquies 
Law, as Morris Raphael Cohen wrote in 1933, is anything but a 
"closed, independent system having nothing to do with economic, 
political, social, or philosophical science. "130 As this study reveals, 
courts cannot be separated from the social and political influences 
that permeate all aspects of constitutional decisionmaking. The 
question of whether three-branch interpretation is qualitatively 
better than judicial supremacy, however, remains. Alexander and 
Schauer consider this question irrelevant to their analysis. Focus-
ing on the stabilizing and coordinating functions of law, they em-
brace judicial finality as the best and only means available to save 
the Constitution from "interpretive anarchy."131 We, of course, disa-
gree with this claim. Perhaps more fundamentally, we think that the 
dialogue that takes place between the Court, elected government, 
and the American people is as constructive as it is inevitable and 
therefore more stable. 
Constitutional decisionmaking is not well served by making chal-
lenges to Supreme Court decisions "more difficult," if not "futile."132 
Complex social policy issues, especially those that implicate consti-
tutional values, are best resolved through "the sweaty intimacy of 
128 On this point, see Eisgruber, supra note 117, at 1014-21. 
129 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 151 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945). 
130 Morris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order: Essays in Legal Philosophy 380-81 
n.86 (1933). 
131 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1379. 
132 Id. at 1386. 
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creatures locked in combat."133 Judges and politicians sometimes 
react differently to social and political forces. Congress, for exam-
ple, focuses its "energy mostly on the claims of large populous in-
terests, or on the claims of the wealthy and the powerful, since that 
tends to be the best route to re-election. "134 Courts, in contrast, are 
less affected by these pressures, for judges possess life tenure.135 
Accordingly, because special interest group pressures affect courts 
and elected officials in different ways, a full-ranging consideration of 
the costs and benefits of different policy outcomes is best accom-
plished by a government-wide decisionmaking process. For this 
reason, courts and elected officials should both be activists in shaping 
constitutional values. 
No doubt, this politicization of constitutional discourse will con-
tribute to partisan, value-laden constitutional analysis.136 Neverthe-
less, complex social policy issues are ill-suited to the winner-take-
all nature of litigation. Emotionally charged and highly divisive is-
sues are best resolved through political compromises that yield 
middle-ground solutions, rather than through an absolutist, and of-
ten rigid, judicial pronouncement. 
Judicial supremacy yields unworkable solutions, not a more eq-
uitable world. "[G]overnment by lawsuit," as Justice Robert Jack-
son warned, "leads to a final decision guided by the learning and 
limited by the understanding of a single profession-the law. "137 
Alexander Bickel puts the matter more directly-"doubt[ing] ... 
the Court's capacity to develop 'durable principles"' and therefore 
doubting "that judicial supremacy can work and is tolerable."138 
Political realities and constitutional values require the judiciary 
to share with other political institutions and society at large the 
m Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the 
Bar of Politics 261 (1962). 
134 Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 269, 273 (1993). 
135 See id. As to what judges maximize, see Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges 
and Justices Maximize?: (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. 
Rev. 1 (1993). 
IJ-6 See generally Louis Michael Seidman & Mark V. Tush net, Remnants of Belief: 
Contemporary Constitutional Issues (1996) (discussing the effect of political influ-
ences on constitutional debates). 
137 Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy: A Study of a Crisis in 
American Power Politics 291 (1941 ). 
138 Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 99 (1970). 
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complex task of interpreting the Constitution. Constitutions do not 
govern by text alone or solely by judicial interpretation. They 
draw their life from forces outside the courts: from ideas, customs, 
society, and statutes. Through this rich and dynamic political proc-
ess, the Constitution is regularly adapted to seek a harmony be-
tween legal principles and the needs of a changing society. Bickel 
described the courts as engaged in a "continuing colloquy with the 
political institutions and with society at large," a process through 
which constitutional principle has "evolved conversationally not 
perfected unilaterally. "139 
III. CONCLUSION 
The chief alternative to judicial exclusivity is not "interpretive 
anarchy,"140 with each public official at every level of government 
making independent judgments of the Constitution. Nor is there 
any evidence that the main purpose of the Constitution was to vest 
a final interpretive authority in a single branch. The overriding 
value of the framers was a system of checks and balances that is an-
tithetical to vesting in any branch a monopoly on constitutional 
values. The result, from the start, was "coordinate construction,"141 
with each branch capable of and willing to make independent con-
stitutional interpretations. That system has endured for more than 
two centuries without deteriorating into interpretive anarchy. 
No single institution, including the judiciary, has the final word 
on constitutional questions. It is this process of give and take and 
mutual respect that permits the unelected Court to function in a 
democratic society. By agreeing to an open exchange among the 
branches, all three institutions are able to expose weaknesses, hold 
excesses in check, and gradually forge a consensus on constitu-
tional values. By participating in this process, the public has an 
opportunity to add legitimacy, vitality, and meaning to what might 
otherwise be an alien and short-lived document. Therein lies true 
stability. 
139 Bickel, supra note 133, at 240, 244. 
140 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1379. 
141 See Fisher, supra note 6, at 231. 
